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Conclusions of Law is included in the addendum herein.)

Moreover, the Mattsons mistake the content of the record by saying certain issues are
being raised for the first time on appeal. These statements are inaccurate. All issues and
evidence discussed in this brief and ProMax's initial appeal brief were at issue before the trial
court, either during trial or through appropriate post-trial motions.1

I.

PHIL BATES COULD NOT HAVE INTERFERED WITH A
CONTRACT THAT DID NOT EXIST AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The Mattsons take issue with whether the existence of the contract is a question of fact
or law. (Appellee Brief, p. 15.) 2 In this case, the offer to contract expired before it was
accepted. Therefore, the trial court's holding that there was a breach of contract is an error of
fact and law. It is not possible to breach a contract that does not exist as a matter of law.
Findings that violate principles of law are not viable. Moreover, even if the standard of
review to be applied by this Court is "clearly erroneous," the trial court's holding that a
nonexistent contract was breached is clearly erroneous.
The Earnest Money Agreement required that the prospective purchaser's offer be
accepted in writing by August 30, 1993. This was never done. Therefore, a valid contract for
the sale of the Mattson home never existed. Thus, the trial court's finding to the contrary and
that it was breached was clearly erroneous.
x

The propriety of the trial court's denial of ProMax's Rule 59 and 60 post-trial motions
is also being appealed herein.
2

The Appellee's brief provided to ProMax does not contain page numbers. For purposes
of citing to Appellee's brief, ProMax considers the page containing the statement of jurisdiction
on page 1.
-2-

The Mattsons claim that this issue wa^ noi ncu^rc :i;i :;..: ,„. i
raising this issue for the first time on appeal

•- ^.ppellee Bucl,

.

i:. r: A:.. . •-

16 y ouui is not the ease.

The contract between ProMax and the Mattsons n is ;i ;•; "t—:1 i MC m the case it trial
tail

l l l . l l IIIII 11" III I. Ill I M i l l ! l l c l C n i l l l i n J

il \ i l l l l l m i

u

IM-IHH

n m i

mi < .1 r

ni m i l l

The •-;

Uitali'i

i n i lllltlt

exist is an erroneous finding of fact and an erroneous legal conclusion. The trial court's ruling
should be reversed,
' The fact that ProMax was unable to inform the lower court prior to and during the trial
that the contract never existed is because! the Mattsons refused U prm Me ProMax with the
I tti iu--t M

J; -

..-:.!!•

i

.

and Instead, •.. -

surprised ProMax and the court with the Earnest Money Agreement ;*; 'nai
ProMax appropriately provider <, . uJ ™\\rt *v\fU i mountain .-; c> idenee which
(-•:-,HPUCVCI,

{

*

• iL d testimony

the trial e.»n:! \ ^\- lopruueh chose to ignore tins information

\n additional

exampk nil f Ill f I.IIIM n \ i ni m i n i li sliiiiunv IP. M U I U I I I U I IIIIIII IUIIM IK nil iln Mittsons 1 bi icf

wherein the Mattsons cite trial testimom as foi]«nu
; Q: • ':- Relating to the sale to Ouii> Joiu^en. JM /OU ever sign the Earnest
Money Agreement?
A:

Yes,

A simple examination of page 2, Section 12 of the Earnest Money Agreement shows that
Mi

Ml illMiii men ni M I ' I I M I III!

II

i)iy ml lllm I'.nntM Monr\ A i ' n v m n i l i inn lliiiiJi'il IIIIIII lln

Addendum.) This evidence and the evidence set forth in ProMax's appeal brief clearly
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establish that the Mattsons obtained a judgment based upon perjured testimony. The trial court
was presented with evidence of such perjured testimony through appropriate post-trial motions
and should have granted ProMax a new trial or should have allowed ProMax to present
additional evidence.

II.

PROMAX DID NOT WAIVE THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

Through formal written discovery, ProMax requested all documents to be used at trial.
Through such discovery, ProMax would have discovered that a written agreement existed and
that the statute of frauds was at issue. However, in spite of the fact that ProMax requested
such documents pursuant to formal discovery requests, the Mattsons never provided such
documents. (R. 416, 436-37.) The Mattsons, therefore, should not be allowed to assert the
statute of frauds as a defense because the Mattsons' actions prevented ProMax from examining
the Earnest Money Agreement and therefore being able to appropriately assert the statute of
frauds.
The Mattsons argue that because they mentioned a written agreement in the Complaint,
ProMax should not be able to assert the statute of frauds. However, without being provided a
copy of the Earnest Money Agreement, ProMax could not determine that the statute of frauds
was applicable. The Mattsons should not be allowed to profit through their own inequitable
conduct.
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I
making the offer that they did not have the funds to go through with the purchase.
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(R. 338-39.) Whatever standard of review is applied, the fact remains that the trial court's
ruling that the mechanic's liens caused or interfered with the failed sale of the Mattson home
was clearly erroneous. Therefore, even if Mr. Bates were to have had ill intent (which he did
not) in causing subcontractors to file mechanic's liens, the filing of the liens did not cause any
damage to the Mattsons because the offer to purchase had already expired.

IV.

EVEN IF MR. BATES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FAILED
SALE OF THE MATTSON HOME. THE $170.000 AWARD IS
EXCESSIVE.

Pages 26 through 28 of ProMax's appeal brief set forth numerous items which establish
that the value of the Mattson home was substantially greater than the $390,000 value which
Matt Mattson testified to. The Mattsons' brief claims that the figures in ProMax's brief were
not before the trial court. This statement is absolutely erroneous. All the information
regarding the value of the Mattson home as discussed in ProMax's brief was before the trial
court. In spite of this mountain of evidence, the trial court relied on Matt Mattson's statement
that he estimated the value of the home to be $390,000. The trial court's ruling was clearly
erroneous.
The only evidence the trial court relied upon in determining the home had a value of
$390,000 was Matt Mattson's own self-serving testimony. In their brief, the Mattsons mislead
the Court by stating that "Culley Davis testified that the home was worth twice the amount of
the mortgage . . . and the mortgage amount was $190,200." Actually, Mr. Davis' testimony
was that the home was worth approximately $440,000. (R. 766-67.)
-6-
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$390,000. Thus, even if Phil Bates were the cause of the alleged failed sale of the Mattson
home, the trial court erred by awarding excessive damages.

V.

THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PROMAX AND THE MATTSONS
WAS THAT PROMAX WOULD BUILD THE MATTSONS' HOME
FOR COST PLUS $10.000.

The Mattsons' argument regarding the cost-plus contract again centers on their claim
that ProMax failed to marshal the evidence. ProMax did not fail to marshal the evidence, and
in fact, has sufficiently demonstrated to the trial court and this Court that the trial court
misinterpreted Mr. Barraclough's testimony and other salient facts in the case. The fact that
the trial court chose to believe Mr. Mattson's false testimony based upon the trial court's
misinterpretation of Mr. Barraclough's testimony and the effect that such misinterpretation had
on the credibility of ProMax and its witnesses, necessitates reversing and/or remanding the
trial court's decision. ProMax has marshaled the evidence relied upon by the trial court in
rendering its decision. That, coupled with the irrefutable evidence that Mr. Mattson offered
false testimony, justifies vacating the trial court's ruling.
The trial court's award of $23,000 for allegedly defective workmanship should also be
vacated. This award was also based upon Mr. Mattson's false testimony and the trial court's
misinterpretation of evidence and testimony. Mr. Mattson should not be permitted to profit
through offering false testimony.
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VI*

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.

On pages 16 through 17 of its brief, ProMax listed several items which the trial court
misinterpreted. Although some of those items were repetitive of issues discussed earlier in
ProMax's brief, the reason behind listing those items was to establish the trial court's failure
to comprehend the facts and to establish that the judge's ruling did not comport with the
evidence.
The judge misinterpreted and misunderstood numerous important issues involved in the
case. Such mistakes constitute reversible error. At a minimum, ProMax should have been
allowed to present additional evidence regarding Mr. Mattson's perjured testimony.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED PROMAX'S MOTION
FOR A PARTIAL NEW TRIAL TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE.

ProMax fulfilled its obligation in marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient when viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict. This task, however, was difficult due to the court's misunderstanding of much of
the evidence. The court essentially viewed evidence in favor of ProMax and interpreted it
incorrectly to favor the Mattsons. ProMax has informed the court through post-trial motions
of its misinterpretations to no avail. Therefore, ProMax's motion for partial new trial to take
additional evidence was improperly denied by the trial court. This Court should not let
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Mr. Mattson's false testimony and the court's resulting prejudice prevent justice from being
done in this case.
The trial court denied ProMax's motion for partial new trial to take additional evidence
on the basis that the evidence presented in conjunction with ProMax's motion and memorandum
should have purportedly been discovered at trial. However, Rules 59 and 60, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, clearly provide that a partial new trial under the circumstances in this case was
appropriate.
This case involved perjured testimony, substantial evidence that the court's judgment was
incorrect, that ProMax was surprised at trial by the Earnest Money Agreement which ProMax
had never previously been provided, that newly discovered evidence existed, that excessive
damage existed, that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court made errors of law.
ProMax's motion for a partial new trial was appropriate under both Rule 59 and 60.
Moreover, the evidence and the proffered testimony in this case were sufficient to compel the
court to grant ProMax's motion.

ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE
TO APPELLEES' CROSS-APPEAL
I.

THE MATTSONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR
ALLEGED OVERRUNS.

The Mattsons contend they are entitled to damages of cost overruns in the amount of
$140,000. The basis for this claim is that the contract was allegedly for approximately $190,000
and the cost overruns allegedly reflect the excess amount which was paid by the Mattsons. What
-10-

the Mattsons fail to inform this Court is that the original agreement, which the Mattsons claim
ProMax breached, involved a much smaller home consisting of approximately 2300 square feet;
less than half the size of the home actually built. (R. 459.)
The Mattsons acknowledge that the home ProMax actually built was not the home that
the purported contract was based upon, but was a much larger home of over 7,000 square feet.
(R. 459, 691-693 and Exhibits 3, 5 and 12.) An award of so-called cost overruns in addition to
receiving a home double the size of what the Mattsons allegedly bargained for would be
inappropriate and only serve to unjustly enrich the Mattsons. See Lincor Contractors. Ltd. v.
Hvskell, 692 P.2d 903, 906 (Wash. App. 1984) ("The plaintiff is n o t . . . entitled to more than he
would have received had the contract been performed"); Murray E. Gildersleeve Logging v.
Northern Timber Corp.. 670 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1983) ("The damages available in a breach of
contract case are limited to those expenses which are in the natural consequence of the breach").
The trial court realized that awarding the alleged cost overruns would unjustly enrich the
Mattsons. In disposing of this issue, the court stated:
[A]s far as the cost overruns are concerned, I conclude that the parties received
what they paid for. Therefore, in my estimation, there is no damage claim back
for that sum.
(R. 779-780.)
Awarding an additional sum for cost overruns to the Mattsons would unjustly enrich the
Mattsons. See Davies v. Olsen. 746 P.2d 264, 268-69 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (theories of quantum
meruit and implied-in-fact contracts prohibit awards of damages exceeding what the party would
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have received had the contract been performed). "A party whose contract has been breached is
not entitled to be placed in a better position because of the breach than he would have been in
had the contract been performed. Board of Educ. of Alamogordo Public School v. Jennings. 701
P.2d361,364(N.M. 1985).
Furthermore, as set forth in ProMax's appeal brief, the trial court erroneously held that
the parties stipulated that $140,000 worth of cost overruns existed. (R. 703-705.) No such
stipulation was ever entered into by ProMax. (R. 662-663, 703-705.) Moreover, with the
exception of Mr. Mattson's testimony that he "thinks" the overruns were $140,000, the Mattsons
never presented the trial court any evidence with respect to the $140,000 in cost overruns.
(R. 261 and 658.)

II.

THE MATTSONS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

The Mattsons claim that the trial court erred in not awarding punitive damages. The
basis for their claim is that although the court held that Phil Bates "maliciously" interfered
with their prospective economic advantage, the court did not award them punitive damages.
Although the court is entitled to award punitive damages upon such a finding, in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-18, the finding must be made with "clear and convincing
evidence" as opposed to the preponderance of the evidence standard to find the occurrence of a
tort. The court made no such finding and, moreover, punitive damages are discretionary with
the fact-finder. The trial court ruled that:

-12-

insufficient evidence has been presented to enable this Court to award punitive
damages or damages under the slander theory.
The Mattsons have failed to show that the Court abused its discretion in declining to
award punitive damages. In this case, where willfulness and maliciousness are, in effect, part
of the cause of action, the courts require an additional showing to award punitive damages.
Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207, 1219 (Utah 1983).
In their reply brief, the Mattsons list the issue of whether they should have been
awarded attorneys' fees for tortious interference with a contractual relationship. The
Mattsons, however, fail to present any argument in support of the issue listed. ProMax,
therefore, considers this a waiver of such argument and declines comment thereon.

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly shows that the trial court's verdict was based upon Matt Mattson's
fraudulent testimony. Moreover, the trial court made numerous factual and legal errors in
rendering its judgment. Furthermore, the $170,000 awarded for tortious interference with
contract was plain error of law because no such contract ever existed and even if such tortious
interference did exist, the contract had expired prior to such action. The award of $170,000
should, therefore, be vacated as should the additional award of $23,000. The remaining issues
should be remanded to the trial court for the taking of additional evidence.
With respect to the Mattsons' cross-appeal, the Mattsons would be unjustly enriched if
they were awarded $140,000 in unproven cost overruns, particularly in light of the fact that
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the Mattsons admit that the home they received was over twice the size of the home they
initially bargained for.
Moreover, the trial court appropriately determined that punitive damages and attorneys'
fees were not appropriate as requested in the cross-appeal.
DATED this /4

day of January, 1997
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Affordable Legal Advocates
Steven C. Russell #6791
G. Brent Smith #6657
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-5100
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PROMAX DEVELOPMENT CO. /
FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 950903616CV
vs.
MATT MATTSON and
SHERIE MATTSON,

Judge Frederick

Defendants.
The trial in this matter was held on the 15th and 16th of
March, 1996, before Judge Frederick.

Plaintiffs Complaint and

Defendants' Counterclaim was the subject of the trial.
was present and represented by Wayne H. Braunberger.

Plaintiff

Defendants

Matt Mattson and Sherie Mattson were present and represented by
G. Brent Smith.

After heraing the evidence and argument by both

parties, the Court now makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OP FACT
1.

Promax (hereinafter Plaintiff) is a Utah Corporation in good
standing in the State of Utah, and is in the business of
building homes and developing proprties.

2.

Phil Bates was, at all times relevant to the facts in this

0 000 8*

case, acting as Plaintiff's agent.
In April, 1993, Phil Bates approached Defendants and
offered, on behalf of Plaintiff, to build a home for
Defendants.
The contract price for building the home was $190,200.00—
plus $29,000.00, which equals one half the price of the
builidng lot.
Culley Davis, Plaintiff's president, testified that the
price of Defendant's home was a "basic price" of
$190,200.00—plus $29,000.00 for the one half of the cost of
the lot.
Defendants obtained a construction loan from Far West Bank,
through Far West Bank's agent Mark Baraclaugh.
Mark Baraclaugh, Promax' banker, testified that Defendant's
home was to be built for a certain dollar figure.
Baraclaugh also testified that a cost plus building contract
was rare and that the bank would not have agreed to lend
Defendants' money had the home been given an open-ended
arbitrary price.
Defendants had excellent credit at the time the loan was
obtained.
On April 15th, 1993, the loan was closed.
Plaintiff built the home and Defendants paid Plaintiff the
2

contract price with the monies obtained from Far West Bank.
Defendants were involved in the usual way in selecting
materials for their home.
As construction proceeded, Plaintiff did not properly pay
for all labor and materials as the contract required.
As a direct result of Plaintiff's failure to properly pay
for those costs, and in order to avoid having liens placed
on their home, Defendants were forced to pay those costs
from their own funds in the amount of $140,000.00 dollars.
Under the contract, the $140,000.00 should have been paid by
Plaintiff.
Phil Bates told Defendants throughout the building project
that Defendant's were within their budget.
Plaintiff was paid in full for all materials and labor
supplied to or performed on Defendants home.
Defendants owe Plaintiff nothing.
The value of the home, when finished, was $390,000.00.
While the home was being built, Plaintiff never obtained any
change orders from Defendants.
While the home was being built, Plaintiff never told
Defendants of any cost over runs.
When the home was completed, Defendants received an offer
from a ready, willing and able buyer, to purchase the home
3
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for $560,000.00 dollars.
Plaintiff, through its agent Phil Bates, represented to
various third persons that Plaintiff was Defendants' selling
agent.
Defendants told Bates that Plaintiff was not allowed to act
as their selling agent.
Plaintiff, through Bates, told Defendants that Plaintiff
"would kill thier deal" if they did not use Plaintiff as
their real estate agent in the sale of their home.
Defendants refused to allow Plaintiff to act as selling
agent.
Because of Defendant's proper refusal to allow Plaintiff to
act as agent in the sale of Defendant's home, Bates and
Plaintiff had five material men and laborors wrongfully file
liens against Defendant's home to scare off the buyer.
These wronfully filed liens were the sole reason that the
buyer suddenly backed out of the contract to buy Defendant's
home.
As a direct result of Plaintiff's wrongfully liening
Defendant's home, Defendants suffered $170,000.00 in
damages, because of the loss of sale.
Phil Bates and Plaintiff have played "bait and switch" with
home owners on at least two other occasions.
4
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Bait and switch is the practice by which one building fee is
established, then as the home is built, the builder breaches
the fee agreement and claims that the builder is owed more
money based on a cost plus or quantum meruit theory.
One of those times Plaintiff practiced bait and switch was
with the Riley family and the other was with the Kumara
family.
Plaintiff gave Defendants a one year warranty for anything
that might go wrong with their home relating to anything
built on their home, while Plaintiff was the general
contractor.
Immedaitely after the completion of the home, Defendants'
home was in need of $23,000.00 of repairs that were
atributable to shoddy workmanship under Plaintiff's sole
direction and control.
Plaintiff is responsible for these repairs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There was a contract between Plaintiff and Defendants
whereby Plaintiff agreed to build Defendants a home.
The contract price was $190,200.00—plus $29,000.00, which
equals one half of the value of the building lot.
The contract price was a fixed cost price, not a cost plus
price.
5

Defendants fully performed their obligations under the
contract, paid Plaintiff in full, and Plaintiff is not
entitled to any award of money or damages.
Plaintiff breached the building warranty, given by Plaintiff
to Defendants, by failing to correct $23,000.00 dollars of
shoddy workmanship cuased by Plaintiff and paid for by
Defendants.
Plaintiff, through their agent Phil Bates, tortiously
interferred with the contract for sale, which contact
existed between Defendants and a buyer who offered to
puchase the home after the home was completed for
$560,000.00.
Defendant is entitled to judgment against Plaintiff in an
amount equal to the difference between the value of the home
at completion ($390,000.00) and the contract price
($540,000.00), or $170,000.00.
Defendant is entitled to judgment against Plaintiff in the
amount of $23,000.00 which equals the amount of repairs
Plaintiff failed to perform.
DATED this

4^ day of

*<Ftf/-c

^. —.,

, 1996,

0GC1C3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the .^—^
day of /?h<^ 4
199 fsi I did deliver a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following persons,
postage prepaid:
Wayne H. Braunberger
Ashton, Braunberger, Poulsen & Boud, P.C.
302 West 5400 South, Suite #103
Murray, UT 84107
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OFFER T O PURCHASE
1 . PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST M O N E Y is given to secure and apply on the p u r c h a s e ^ the property situated at
jbject to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in
ccordance wtth Section G . Said property is owned by

•

^M

M)

i/,» Unlink

sellers, and is more particularly described

F^fiiflL^

V\n4

7

F

Z ^

>

-

CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES
D UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
• Vacant Lot
D Vacant Acreage
D Other
.
\
O f IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY
• Commercial ff Residential
• Condo
D Other
(a) Included Items, Unless excluded below, this sale shall Include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property.
The following personal
:
^
onal property
property shall
shall also
also be
be includedln
included in this
1 sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title(b) Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale*.
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in t^e purchase p'ice:
CJJ public sewer ET connected
Dwell
• connected
D other
H electricity
CVconnec'ed
\
D septic tank -- • connected
**
D irrigation water / secondary system
• Ingress & egress by private easement
">
• other sanitary system
# of shares
Company
\3f dedicated road • paved
* ^
s
EJ public water ^ c o n n e c t e d
D T V antenna
• master antenna Gfprewired *
t ^ c u r b and gutter
*
I
'*
• private water D connected
C? natural gas
S connected
*
D other rights
Lj
i

(d) Survey. A certified survey Q shall be furnished at the expense of
L* ^ ^
«
*=di£LjL~ '"** ...
prior to closing, • shall rot be furnished.
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual Inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts It in its present physical
condition, ftvrept- / « ! fcJ" (j/j rJ ndllvri)
_ _ _

2 PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property «
• ; ' \ r^^
> l! i' >f I ' O
•

\

nUi){tfy

*f

Dollars ($
J. *\> l \ . \ )
which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT:
" ^
^
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing." pCC&O^&'Cl

Si X ? [ 1 " > \ U k — ^ I 1Pli<fi

. )/L

) which shall be paid'as follows:
/"
,
^
%
1 ( . £ > £ / (JuOJ * j d U ' M "
-^>

representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer,
which obligation bears interest at

;

^f^

% per annum with monthly payments of $

which Include* ; • principal^" • interest,D taxesf • Insurance;<r) F • condo fees;' • other
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears Interest at
% per annum with monthly payments of $ _
which include:
U principal;
U interest;
U taxes; U insurance;
U condo fees;
U other.
f' **"^\ L ^ ^ L J representing balance, If any, includlna proceeds from,a new rnortgage loan, orfieller/financlng, to be paid as follows:

TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE , _

«••; fj*'

-r

*

w

...

1f Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation (In which case Section F shall al3o apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer 3gree3 to use best efforts
to assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending Institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees
to make application within
fv ' "T"
days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new financing at
an Interest rate not to exceed
'
%* If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within
'*'
" days after Seller's acceptance
of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to _ _ _ _ _
points, not to exceed *
(n addition, seller agrees to pay $ _ _ _ _ _ to be used for Buyer's other loan costs,
Page two of a four p a g t form '

Seller's Initials (

)(

)

Date'.

±

**

,
Buw
, $\n\foto((l(t)J[~'
_,

,)J

mortgage loan discount
<<< , c ^

Date

6fe><\r{z$}

i encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by CYa current policy oNJtl
ltd an attorney's opinion (See Section H). f <^j> $ W///>rfA Uffl
*&- \£)
«4. INSPECTION OP TITLE. In accordance with Section 0; Buyer shall have the opportunity to Inspect the title to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shall take title
ib]oct to any existing restrictive covenants, Including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has (Y has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement
3 5. VESTING OP TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyr' m fniinw
•W""—:—..,17' ^•• • •
^-r
-zr*:
6. SELLERS W A R R A N T I E S . In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted:
Kceptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the'following:'
* 7 . SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS A N D C O N T I N G E N C I E S . This W e f V m a d e subject to"the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied
tor to closing:
/
>#
.
• \
.- ..
•»V:.
• K 5 H ' 'W//(?/?/?/•/.-rtl4»••'-'"*;
*«T*«
.•jjAiTrv.v'i * ; U A S .
J-:-v. ,.*tO'.N*~ ^i,.u.'*if

V

^
8. CLOSING OF S A L E . This Agreement shall be closed on or before .

UQC,

' ' , 19

IS

; - ! J at a reasonable location to be designated b y

slier, subject to Section 0 . Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office ail documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with <<.
& Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made "as o f !

of possession Q date*of closing D other *" '•'

,f

'-'"'

'"•" '

^

N

^ 9 . POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on

'ff.w T • ' / l\£
iii^ifl^ftrtflnriflH
by wi
written agreement of parties.
a* \\ rt unless
extended Dy
.represents Q^Selier ( ) Buyer, \
'10. AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the'signJng of this Agreement the listing aqant - r f\ 11 tY^.O'^
K ' :T
id the selling agent
iff I if [ Q* 0~;Q I ft ;"'"• •*•*•''*' *•••*&•• rapft^Q^ts*(_JiSeller (^^Buyer/B'i^r'ahVs^N^c\)nfInTi''th'at"prior to signing this Agreement
ritten disclosure of the agency reiationship(s) was provided to hirn/heX^f^^J^^iuyer's initials ( v ) (. ) Seller's!)
HEREOF HAVE BEEN
'if. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTKERWISEINDICATED AB0vl7fr#GENERAL PROVISION'SECTIONS ON THE R!
CCEPTED.BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE.':'
<$
:12. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall
ave until' ]~J*^^

(AMJ^\

luyer's
luyer's Signature)

/

':(i/j.

->/*') ,19 A > , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent snail return the EARNEST

/

luyer's S i g n a t u r e ) ; ; ^ r ; '"""5V; l

(Date)*'
* "v!~

/

'

(Address)
v

*(Date) ' - ^

••••-

•'

f

V K

•••"..-

(Address),

(Phone)

......

(SSN/TAX ID)
(SSN/TAX ID)

(Phone)

HECK O N E .
^
,,, i . '••" '"'•".'•'"• Z! ACCEPTANCE O F OFFER T O P U R C H A S E : Seller hereby A C C E P T S the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified a b o v e . , v $.
B ^ R E J E C T I O N . Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing '<&**- " '' -:' • "':V; • (Seller's initials) V ^ • ^ ; • ']'. ^.w~-v-'/-* ^ •:•»'•• »•- •• ••v'r^-v.v "^
13 COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing'bffer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and
presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's a«»pta'nftft RnyflVghairhflvft'until
(AM/PM)'
' r1 9
to accept the terms

^^M^0^vV--

;

.

. " ' . • • • • • • • / - : :..

;

'

' & j # & & ^

>^;U;«f*y,:.;^ -••

. ., :> : ; ; ; - : ^ : v ; - c ; 7 . - . - • • • ; ; • / : r ^ . . . ••;.;- \
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?

-
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-:*\ • '

': -

:

' V :•*•: . - . ^ v

•••'*"
• • - .

-

;

,

;

•

:

'

: ; . :

r

- '

Seller's Signature)..

(Date) ' ; i - '

Seller's Signature)

(Date)

'

W

• • • • • : • : . i ^ * ' . -

• • ' • : • . • ' "

.'•;.->;'(Time)

-

•

«'

:;.

• -

' - • ; • ' • ' ' ;

• • /

t W

: v

:

•-^.-..

l.?,

*•"'-

-••., •
•:

> ; . ,

• ,':, , f " '

"

L

*

v

"^
• »^ »

•

(Address)

... •-•

(Phone) ,;

(SSN/TAX ID)

-

(Phone) »

.,., (Time)

(SSNATAX ID)

•'•:>••-••,:$&•

frIECK ONE::% <
D>CCEI^ANCEbF" COUNTER OFFER/Buyer herebyACCEPTSm
OFFER.: :•' -v ^ v ^ ^ - • • ' ^ ; ' ^ ^ ^ »:
P REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS fre^UNTER OFFER, ^
"',t '
(Buyer's !niUals)77;^';{-, -^
'/,'X^'JL
D . C O U N T C R W F E R ^ Buyer hereby ACCEPTSIhe'cOUNTER OFFER wWi''modiflcatIons"'bn attachWiAddendum.l^'J^'V,

Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

(Buyer's Signature)

'V (Time)

(Date)

(Time)

. •••-:; • , „ • •
DOCUMENT RECEIPT
.:
^ State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed).

%k*Q I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing'Agreement bearing all slgnaturi§r !AW : *•;?)•?}•,-, -»• ;>*'" '^.•v.'V'V ;P" i ^ .^••v '••"•'<
MjaNATURE0F8ELU«
j^,y;v.^.-- •

,

mW#*w"

•- '

"•

:, ^
- . >;•••••••

/ • ' ...- >-';S'.-«',v
;•••<;.£:•:
• r-c.

> i » ^ T U « l OP BUYERS Vy»v%. • ^ I-I"'./ ^ r
•• •••••••^,^'.$^M'^
• •• •

*W$?0'Wt-;!*: * ,r.
DS»

,S;5v'</^'^«

B. D ] personally ctuitd • final copy of th« foregoing Agraomant bearing ell ilgnaturee to be mailed^on^l

Wiy'.; J
•• ; ••'

TS5T
.,1».

.by

REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE COMMISSION
ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS
The following arc ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS for

transaction described in an Earnest Money Sales
between
Buyer of the real property described as follows

LISTING/SELLING BROKERAGE INFORMATION

Listing Brokerage

Business Address

Selling Brokerage

' B u s m e s s Address

Listing Agent

Phone

Phone
'
Selling Agent

£hone
Phone

BROKERAGE COMMISSION
To the extent these ESCROW INSTRUCTIONS modify any prior agreements between the Buyer or Seller and the
Listing and/or Selling Brokerages, regarding the payment of a real estate brokerage commission or fee, the terms of
these Escrow Instructions shall supersede those prior agreements. The total real estate brokerage commission to be
paid in this transaction is $ \if /foffiwhich represents Q % of the agreed sales price of S 5C?f <JCQ The
undersigned authorize and direct the closing office to disburse the brokerage commission directly to the Listing and
Selling Brokerages in the following manner S lifnfbD to the Listing Brokerage; $ — Q """ to the Selling
Brokerage; Other (explain^ T/?o #6?rf,/VJ U Off) <f\ti \-.lX(('J
lf\filu(itS
U :?V*

SHln

s JrO0//r/S,

. '

'

The undersigned agree to the above terms.

^

Af<oAJ<>.

Listing Broker #

^-M^
Date

,

jf/L^

Selling Broker

fry.??
Date

SIGNATURE^) OF INDIVIDUAL^ PAYING THE COMMISSION (BUYER OR SELLER) ARE
REQUIRED ONLY IF THIS AGREEMENT MODIFIES A PRIOR COMMISSION AGREEMENT.

Buyer

Dale

Seller

Date

Buyer

Date

Seller

Date

This form approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission July 1,1987

